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Introduction
On April 19, 2012 India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) 
successfully test-fired the indigenously developed Agni-V ballistic missile, which has an 
estimated range of 5,000 kilometers and is purportedly capable of striking any target within 
China, including Beijing.1 It is the longest-range missile to be tested by India to date. In addition 
to the Agni-V, New Delhi has developed a multiplicity of delivery systems, including other land-
based ballistic missile systems. It is also close to incorporating the nuclear missile-equipped 
submarines, the INS Arihant. These nuclear force enhancements have occurred simultaneously 
with a quantitative expansion of India’s nuclear warhead stockpile. The current understanding of 
the Indian nuclear trend lines – and arms buildups and races, more broadly – necessitate a 
comprehensive assessment. This essay seeks to answer this question: Why is India engaging in a 
quantitative and qualitative enhancement of its nuclear force capabilities?
The development of a nascent nuclear capability began when India’s nuclear program 
was formed shortly after it received independence in 1947. Shrouded by secrecy, New Delhi 
commissioned a team of scientists to pursue nuclear-related objectives. The program sought 
initially to develop civil nuclear energy and a “peaceful” nuclear explosions (PNEs) capability, 
both of which were ostensibly intended for economic development and enhancing international 
prestige.2 Two critical points signaled progress to Indians and the international community. First, 
India conducted a PNE in 1973,3 and second, it successfully detonated five nuclear weapons in 
1 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2012. “Indian nuclear forces, 2012.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68 
(4): 96.
2 Perkovich, George. 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press.
3 Ibid.
May 1998.4 After having tested nuclear weapons in 1998, India’s development of different 
quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons capabilities has increased dramatically.
This is not a new phenomenon. Nation-states have bolstered their conventional and 
nuclear capabilities consistently throughout history. There is a plethora of examples. One 
includes the notable Anglo-German naval arms race at the dawn of the twentieth century. 
Another includes the U.S. and Soviet Union’s allocation of astronomical amounts of resources 
for each nation’s defense and national security. The highest number of nuclear weapons the 
United States had in its stockpile during the Cold War was 31,255,5 and at times the Soviet 
Union possessed even more. These are two examples among the history of nation-states replete 
with military buildups.
Nuclear arms buildups can take two forms: quantitative and qualitative. A quantitative 
buildup is a simple increase in the number of nuclear weapons that a country possesses. 
Technological capabilities remain constant. On the other hand, a qualitative enhancement of 
nuclear forces involves the development and operationalization of capabilities that are more
sophisticated technologically. For example, a country can develop missiles that have longer 
ranges and warheads that deliver a higher payload. Other capabilities, such as nuclear 
submarines, make a country’s nuclear forces less vulnerable to a nuclear first strike conducted by 
an adversary. Oftentimes, qualitative and quantitative force enhancements occur in tandem. As 
will be discussed in detail later in this thesis, India has done both of these force developments.
4 Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organization (India). 17 May 1998. “Joint 
Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organisation.” 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/india/1998/980500-drdo.htm>.
5 United States Government. 2010. “Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile,” 
Department of Defense (May 3):
<http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf>.
While there are clear examples of the buildup of nuclear weapons and defense 
capabilities, it is difficult to discern the root cause(s) of these policies, as decision-making 
processes are extremely complex and involve a multiplicity of stakeholders and actors with 
varying interests. Scholarship in the field tends to focus on either the impact of external threats 
on state policymaking on one hand, or the influence of bureaucratic interests on the other. By 
examining India’s nuclear development through these two different lenses, one can gain better 
insights into the decision-making dynamics within New Delhi and how states in general 
approach the possibility of increasing their quantitative and qualitative nuclear and military 
capabilities.
This essay provides a holistic analysis of India’s qualitative and quantitative nuclear 
arsenal buildup and uses Robert Jervis’s “spiral model” and theories of bureaucratic politics to 
gain a better understanding of the root causes of this buildup. I argue that, given the available 
evidence, the majority of India’s nuclear force enhancement and expansion has been caused by 
the external threat posed by Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, by China. It is also argued that 
bureaucracies may have influence on the final policy outcomes, though it is more difficult to 
establish a clear causal relationship.
There are various reasons for exploring India’s build up of nuclear weapons. First, 
various conclusions will yield different policy proposals. Certain policies under certain 
circumstances are capable of minimizing the risks of war. If nuclear weapons buildups are 
caused by a state’s sense of insecurity due to a perceived external threat, then tension-reducing 
and deterrence enhancing measures may be necessary. Moreover, this essay contributes to the 
broader literature on Indian nuclear strategy and planning and helps us to understand the 
complex security environment in South Asia as well as the different ways that India approaches 
its nuclear strategy. Beyond this addition to our existing understanding of India, we can also gain 
a better understanding of the conditions that facilitate cooperation or fuel competition and 
conflict.
Nuclear weapons and defense policies – especially in one formulated in India – are 
developed in an extremely secretive way. First, this makes any research on this issue fraught 
with limitations and speculation. This caveat weakens the foundation upon which my argument 
rests, but it does not mean that the issue cannot be explored as there is plenty of evidence 
available to draw some conclusions. Secondly, no single theory of arms racing or arms buildups 
will be confirmed or disconfirmed. However, the evidence available is more capable of being 
analyzed through Jervis’s spiral model than the bureaucratic politics theory. The evidence used 
in this thesis includes publicized missile tests, nuclear arsenal estimates, and public statements 
by policymakers in India. By piecing these fragments of evidence together, this thesis illuminates 
the probable root causes of India’s qualitative and quantitative nuclear force development.
This essay proceeds as follows. First, I delve into the existing literature on arms races and 
arms buildups. This survey of previous scholars’ attempts at understanding this complex and 
dynamic phenomenon is crucial for framing the analysis of India’s recent developments. As will 
be shown, the literature on arms races and arms buildups falls into a dichotomy of causal 
explanations: external threats versus internal influences, which are the common explanations 
among scholars and experts of India’s nuclear weapons program. After the literature review, I 
provide a detailed overview of India’s quantitative and qualitative force developments: the 
expansion of the nuclear warhead stockpile, the development and deployment of cruise and 
ballistic missile capabilities, and sea-based nuclear systems.
I proceed by assessing the causal relationship that potentially exists between various 
external threats and policy outcomes on one hand, and between organizations/bureaucracies and 
policy outcomes on the other. This analysis explores the first causal possibility by applying 
Robert Jervis’s spiral model, and the bureaucratic interest theory is used to analyze as the second 
possible explanation. I find that Robert Jervis’s spiral model and the available evidence 
regarding India’s perceptions and trend-lines suggest that most of India’s nuclear developments 
have been caused by the threat posed by Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, China. The available 
evidence also suggests that the influence of bureaucratic interests may also be having some 
impact, though it is more difficult to establish a clear causal connection. Moreover, I also discuss 
the importance of Indian nationalism – and Hindu nationalism – and the Indian identity in 
inflating the perceived threat posed by Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim nation. After providing 
a final account of my findings in the conclusion, I propose various policies that may minimize 
the risks of a potential nuclear war.
Literature Review
India’s nuclear weapons expansion and enhancements have been considerable, and the 
potential explanations abound. Before conducting an in-depth exploration of India’s nuclear 
capabilities buildups, it is important to examine the literature that attempts to explain the reasons 
states choose to build up arms and/or engage in an arms race with perceived external adversaries. 
These theories fall into two broad categories of causal explanations. The first explicates arms 
buildups as a result of the presence of external threats to one state’s security. The second argues 
that bureaucratic and organizational interests primarily impact the policymaking process. These 
organizations include branches of the military and research and development organizations, 
among others. Existing scholarly and expert explanations of India’s nuclear buildup also fall into 
the two explanatory categories of external and internal causes of state policy. Each approach has 
relative strengths and weaknesses.
External Causes of Arms Buildups
The first approach to arms buildups and arms races focuses on the impact of an external 
security threat on states’ policymaking. This is rooted in the Realist paradigm of International 
Relations.6 One crucial component of realism is that states operate in an anarchic (absence of a 
supreme authority about nation states) and self-help nature of the international system. With each 
state fending for its own survival, the presence of an external threat catalyzes the buildup of a 
certain military capability. However, when one country bolsters its security, its adversary feels 
less secure. As a result, the latter state responds by matching or exceeding the capabilities of the 
original state. This cycle continues and turns into what is called the “security dilemma.” This 
external threat dynamic leads into an arms race between the two states and becomes extremely 
difficult to escape. The external threat-based literature broadly agrees about the causes of arms
buildups, save for a few nuances. 
Samuel Huntington crafted one of the first arguments regarding the impact of external 
threats on states’ decisions to build up their military capabilities.7 By analyzing over ten different 
arms races, Huntington argues that external threats are the cause of arms races and buildups and 
that “the increase [in arms] in itself becomes an accepted and anticipated stabilizing factor in the 
relations between two nations.”8 These cases include the aforementioned Anglo-German naval 
buildup from the early part of the 20th century and the early stages of the arms race between the 
6 For important works on the realist theory of international relations, see: Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of 
International Politics. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill; and Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
7 Huntington, Samuel P. 1958. “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results” Public Policy 8: 41-86.
8 Huntington, 63.
United States and Soviet Union. He argues further that arms races can be both stabilizing and 
destabilizing for the relations between two states, depending on the circumstances.
Other scholars and experts have argued in similar terms as Huntington, observing a clear 
tit-for-tat (or, “action-reaction”) dynamic taking place between two states which pose security 
threats to one another.9 Beyond this literature, Robert Jervis pushes further in his examination of 
the security dilemma and arms races by arguing that psychological variables also play a 
significant role.10 His theory is called the “spiral model.” For Jervis, the first step in an arms race 
involves states developing images of each other (hostile, friendly, neutral, etc.). These images are 
derived from states’ prior experiences with each other and the nature and magnitude of the 
military capabilities that each one possesses.11 If two states have hostile images of each other, 
then they fall down a spiral of fear and hostility. The result is that these hostile images form a 
cognitive rigidity among each state when viewing the other’s actions and capabilities.12
According to Jervis, a cognitive rigidity characterized by hostility reinforces the security 
dilemma.13 When the security dilemma sets in and cognitive rigidity solidifies, states find it 
difficult to escape from this dilemma. As a result, states will almost always assimilate 
information to preexisting beliefs and interpret ambiguous and discrepant information in a 
negative way.14 Jervis argues that the effects of the security dilemma – compounded by 
psychological constraints that bind policymakers – precipitate an arms race between states that 
have hostile images of each other.
9 Buzan, Barry and Eric Herring. 1998. The Arms Dynamic in World Politics. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner); 
McNamara, Robert. 1967. “The Dynamics of the Nuclear Strategy” Department of State Bull 57; Freedman, 
Lawrence. 1981. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. (New York: St. Martins).
10 Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press).
11 Jervis, 68.
12 Jervis, 68.
13 Jervis, 64.
14 Jervis, 143-145.
A third piece in the external threat literature worth examining is Charles Glaser’s 
“offense-defense” approach to arms races.15 Glaser argues that arms races are fundamentally 
driven by a state’s sense of insecurity. However, what causes insecurity is the ability of an 
adversary to conduct an offensive military operation against one state.16 A state is driven by a 
profound sense of insecurity when the adversary has the incentive to attack. The logical response 
is a buildup of military capabilities to offset the adversary’s capability. Glaser additionally 
argues that if one of the states is “greedy” and pursues non-security objectives, the arms race will 
become catalyzed even further.17 Glaser’s approach differs from the traditional external threat 
arguments by stating that “sub-optimal” state behavior regarding arms buildups are caused by 
irrational domestic actors.18 Glaser’s most noticeable contribution from the previous external 
threat literature is that arms races are not caused by the threat a state poses in and of itself. 
Rather, the ability of one state to conduct an offensive military operation against the other creates 
the insecurity that catalyzes an arms race.
Each of these studies has its relative strengths and weaknesses. For example, 
Huntington’s piece draws from a wide variety of cases but errs by concluding that quantitative 
and qualitative arms races have completely separate outcomes. Oftentimes, quantitative and 
qualitative buildups occur simultaneously. Jervis’s argument, while substantially backed by 
evidence, assumes at the outset of his piece that state behavior is a product of the external threat 
environment. Finally, Charles Glaser’s argument is problematic because it is extremely difficult 
to determine a particular setting whether “offense” or “defense” has the advantage. For example, 
tactical nuclear weapons may create the perception of offensive advantage, even though the use 
15 Glaser, Charles. 2000. “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races” Annual Review of Political Science 3: 
251-276.
16 Glaser, 267. 
17 Glaser, 268-269.
18 Glaser, 272.
of tactical nuclear weapons would ultimately lead to the destruction of the country if its
adversary also possessed nuclear weapons. From the above review of this literature, I feel that 
Robert Jervis’s argument is nuanced and will provide a proper analytic framework through 
which India’s nuclear development can be analyzed, especially given the conceptual 
shortcomings of Glaser’s theory.
The literature that specifically examines India’s nuclear buildup has argued in a similar 
vein that the root cause of New Delhi’s decision-making is the presence of two external security 
threats: China and Pakistan. For example, Pant, Bharath, and Basrur argue that various strands of 
India’s nuclear forces, especially the long-range ballistic missiles, are being developed in order 
to respond to the Chinese security threat.19 In a similar assessment, Jaclyn Tandler and Toby 
Dalton argue that India’s nuclear force development has, over time, become almost exclusively 
focused on the threat emanating from China.20 Others have argued that the quantitative 
expansion of India’s warhead stockpile and development of sea-based nuclear capabilities are 
responses to the security threat posed by Pakistan.21 One problematic aspect of the India-specific 
literature is that the arguments focus on disparate strands of the Indian nuclear developments 
instead of providing a more comprehensive assessment. Moreover, the literature has yet to 
systematically assess the relative influence of the Chinese and Pakistani threats on India’s 
nuclear force developments. To make this assessment, I will use Robert Jervis’s spiral model.
19 Basrur, Rajesh. 2004. “India’s Escalation-resistant Nuclear Posture” in Escalation Control and the Nuclear 
Option in South Asia, eds., Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones and Ziad Haider. Washington, DC: The Henry L. 
Stimson Center: 59; Pant, Harsh and Gopalaswamy Bharath. 2008. “India’s Emerging Missile Capability: The 
Science and Politics of Agni-III” Comparative Strategy 27 (4): 381.
20 Dalton, Toby and Jaclyn Tandler. 2012. “Understanding the Arms “Race” in South Asia” The Carnegie Papers 
(September).
21 See: Rehman, Iskander. 2012. “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the 
Indian Ocean” Naval War College Review 63 (4) (Autumn): 64-88; and Pant, Harsh. 2007. “India’s Nuclear 
Doctrine and Command Structure” Armed Forces & Society 33 (2) (January): 238-264.
Internal and Bureaucratic Causes of Arms Buildups
It has also been frequently argued that arms races and buildups are caused primarily by 
the pressure of bureaucratic and domestic organizations’ interests. This diverges from the 
previously-explained Realist perspective because the state is viewed as an aggregate of actors, 
rather than a singular unit. For bureaucratic and organizational perspective, the source of 
strategic policy lies in the specific interests and influence that different bureaucracies have 
within the state’s decision-making process. Organizations’ interests depend on each one’s 
history, objectives, and organizational culture. More importantly, these theories do not preclude 
the potential influence of external threats. Other pieces of literature (as will be explained further 
in the next sections) examine the desire of military branches to have the most sophisticated 
weaponry and the influence of their proclivity for offensive doctrines. Research and development 
organizations hope to continually develop prestigious technologies and capabilities. All of these 
organizations seek financial resources. The bureaucratic politics theory contains a wide variety 
of analyses that focuses on different types of organizations.
Several authors argue that bureaucratic interests play the primary role in foreign 
policymaking,22 and others, such as Scott Sagan, have looked at bureaucratic influences in the 
formulation of nuclear weapons policies, more specifically.23 This literature argues that different 
bureaucracies within a state have specific interests, which are based on each organization’s 
goals, interest in maintaining a steady flow of funds, and the desire to be on the cutting edge of 
technological innovations.24 As each sub-state bureaucracy and organization competes to be the 
22 See: Halperin, Morton H. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution).
23 Sagan, Scott. 1996-1997. “Why do states build nuclear weapons?” International Security 21 (3) (Winter): 54-86; 
Greenwood, Ted. 1975. Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision-Making (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger).
24 Sagan, Scott. “Why do states…”
dominant voice in a state’s particular foreign policy, the final decision to build up a state’s 
nuclear weapons capability is a reflection of successful lobbying efforts by these specific 
organizations.
Some scholars have examined the specific role of research and development 
organizations in influencing states’ policy outcomes. These R&D organizations within a 
bureaucratic structure develop a new capability, and then successfully convince the central 
decision makers that the newly developed weaponry will enhance a state’s security.25 Thus, the 
advancement of R &D organizations’ interests in maintaining funding and remaining on the 
cutting-edge of weapons systems development is a reflection of how bureaucratic interests are a 
root cause the decision to move forward with different capabilities. Unfortunately, this 
scholarship specifically does not extend its analysis to the potential influence of branches of the 
military.
Another body of literature within the internal causes of arms buildups scholarship 
examines the influence that branches of the military have on states’ foreign policies, weapons 
systems acquisitions, and, by extension, the nuclear force planning process. For example, Allison 
and Morris have argued that the U.S.’s acquisition of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
forces were largely a product of the armed services’ desire to have the most sophisticated 
weaponry and protect their autonomy in strategic decision-making.26 Additionally, scholarship 
on military doctrine and the influence of “offensive” doctrines adopted by the military show how 
25 For literature that assesses the role of research and development organizations in state policy making, see: Brooks, 
Harvey. “The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race” Daedalus 104: 75-98; Shapley, Deborah. 
1978. “Technology Creep and the Arms Race: ICBM Problem a Sleeper” Science (September 22): 1102-1105; 
Buzan, Barry. 1987. An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press; and Evangelista, Matthew. 1988. Innovation and the Arms Race. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
26 Allison, Graham and Fredric Morris. 1975. “Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons” Daedalus 104: 99-
129.
policymakers would come to see the most advanced weapons systems as being necessary 
guarantors of national security.27 Such offensive doctrines become more “effective” when the 
state acquires the most advanced weaponry and as much of that weaponry as possible. This 
causal chain of events manifests itself in the buildup of arms, and could arguably be seen in the 
nuclear realm.
Since most countries’ strategic decisions regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear force 
planning are made in utmost secret (as are India’s), it is extremely difficult to establish a causal 
link that would suggest that the competing interests of bureaucracies and organizations have 
manifested themselves in the acquisition of the most sophisticated weaponry, including the 
overall expansion of a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the argument regarding the branches of the 
military having influence over policymaking is difficult to generalize because countries have 
different civil-military arrangements, which affect the way in which a particular branch of the 
military is capable of influencing final policies. Undoubtedly, however, this component of arms 
racing and arms expansion is worth exploring in India’s case because of the existence of those 
bureaucracies and organizations within India that potentially have influence on policies.
One further possible internal explanation for the rapid buildup of weapons systems is the 
role of nationalism and the overall sense that a country needs to be a dominant actor in a 
particular region or over a certain competitor. The dynamic potentially works in a way where a 
nation’s identity leads policymakers to inflate a perceived external threat. This then leads key 
decision-makers to overreact. There have been a number of scholarly pieces on the role of 
27 Posen, Barry. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between Wars (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press); Snyder, Jack. 1984. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decisions and the Disasters 
of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of 
Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); and Kier, Elizabeth. 1997. Imagining War: French and British 
Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
nationalism and national identities in driving states’ foreign policies.28 These potential internal 
dynamics are also considered when looking at India’s nuclear arms buildup and expansion.
Within the India-centric literature, substantial attention has been paid to the potential 
influence of bureaucracies in New Delhi’s nuclear weapons policies and trajectory. In a single-
case study of the country’s nuclear expansion and enhancements, P.R. Chari argues that India’s 
pursuit of the nuclear triad of land, sea, and air-based nuclear capabilities is a direct result of 
competition among the different branches of India’s armed services.29 In another case study,
India’s Nuclear Bomb, George Perkovich argues that the reason that India decided to move 
forward with the development, testing, and operationalization of the nuclear weapons capability 
was in large part due to the inordinate amount of influence that the research and development 
establishment had on policymakers.30 To a lesser degree, Rajesh Basrur echoes these sentiments 
and states that “organizational interests and perceptions do seem to play an unacknowledged role 
in bolstering arguments [about what capabilities constitute “credible minimum deterrence”].”31
The lack of exploration of bureaucratic interests playing a role in policymaking in India since the 
1998 nuclear tests necessitates further exploration in this essay.
Literature Review Conclusion
As seen above, much of the literature regarding arms races and arms buildups has 
generally fallen into an “external threat” and “internal influence” dichotomy. It is important to 
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics. New York: 
Columbia University Press; Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press; Campbell, David. 1992. Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics 
of identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Hadfield, Amelia. 2010. British foreign policy, national 
identity, and neoclassical realism. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.
29 Chari, P.R. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine.” 131.
30 Perkovich, George. 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
31 Basrur, Rajesh. “India’s Escalation-resistant Nuclear Posture” in Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in 
South Asia, eds., Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones and Ziad Haider (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 2004): 60.
consider the relative relevance of these theories and use them to yield insights into the 
underlying causes as to why India is embarking on its current nuclear path. I will further explore 
these different possibilities in the forthcoming sections where I delve into the Indian nuclear 
force trend lines. Moreover, I specifically use Robert Jervis’s spiral model, and then explore the 
bureaucratic politics to assess glean insights regarding India’s force capabilities.
India Nuclear Program and Development Background
This section provides an overview of the history of India’s nuclear program, its nuclear 
strategy and posture, and the new capability enhancements since its weapons program became 
overt in 1998. The history of India’s nuclear program has several critical points, which include 
key decisions to establish and advance the program and test nuclear devices and weapons. 
India’s nuclear strategy and posture are comprised by several core tenets: use of nuclear weapons 
as political instruments (not war-fighting tools); deter adversaries; no-first use of nuclear 
weapons; assured retaliation in response to a nuclear strike against India; separation of warheads 
from delivery vehicles; and the pursuit of “credible minimum deterrence” capabilities. There has 
been a wide range of capabilities that the Indian government has developed in its ostensible 
pursuit of the credible minimum deterrent capability. This background information on the 
development of India’s nuclear arsenal establishes a foundation upon which analysis of Indian 
decision-making can be conducted.
The Indian nuclear program began shortly after the country’s independence from Great 
Britain in 1947. The Indian Parliament and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru established the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the necessary scientific research organizations to 
develop a “peaceful” nuclear capability for economic development, though in reality, the 
technology could also be used to develop nuclear weapons.32 The nuclear establishment pushed 
forward with the development of a peaceful nuclear capability through the 1950s and 1960s. 
While the nuclear bomb lobby within the establishment clamored for India’s leaders to push 
forward with a nuclear weapons capability, the critical decision-makers resisted. This stance 
changed in the early 1970s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi along with others in the national 
security apparatus decided to prepare for a peaceful nuclear explosion. The context of this 
decision was the 1971 Bangladesh War with Pakistan, an increased U.S. presence in Diego 
Garcia (Indian Ocean), and after Communist China had tested a nuclear weapon. The nuclear 
device was eventually detonated in 1974, sparking condemnation from the international 
community.33 The first nuclear test was the initial watershed moment that signaled to the world 
just how far India had come in the development of its nuclear program.
The Indian nuclear program went through a dormant period, of sorts, after the nuclear test 
in 1974 until 1980. Though India’s research and development team made modest advances, 
further nuclear weapons development was not central for Prime Minister Gandhi from 1975-77, 
due primarily to the focus that her “Emergency” domestic rule had necessitated.34 When the 
nuclear program was run under the control of another political party after Gandhi’s ouster until 
1980, it floundered and did not produce many noteworthy results.35 Then, throughout the 1980s, 
the nuclear program gained steam and began to develop nuclear warheads and embarked on a 
ballistic missile project.36 However, throughout this period, it is important to note that India’s 
policymaking elite were still ambivalent about whether or not India should become an overt 
nuclear power.
32 Perkovich, George. 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 20.
33 Ibid, 146-189.
34 Ibid, 192.
35 Ibid, 212-222.
36 Ibid, 226-292.
As the Indian nuclear program moved into the 1990s, international pressure on India to 
halt its nuclear activities – though present throughout the duration of India’s nuclear program –
mounted. In the face of these pressures and sanctions, India’s Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 
decided in 1995 that India would conduct a nuclear weapons test.37 However, the plan was 
halted, but with the election of a new Hindu-nationalist political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), in 1998 India decided to prepare for the nuclear weapons test.38 In the two years prior to 
the tests, peace talks between India and Pakistan were conducted in hopes of averting a crisis 
between the two countries and reducing tensions on nuclear-related issues. In spite of these talks, 
the BJP leaders decided to conduct a series of nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, which made 
India’s nuclear weapons capability overt.39 This watershed moment for the program was 
reciprocated by Pakistan’s own nuclear weapons test. The development of a nuclear posture and 
strategic vision would be necessary at this point.
After the nuclear tests occurred in 1998, the Indian government had to make critical 
decisions regarding how the nuclear arsenal would be used. After 1998, India’s nuclear posture 
and strategy began to emerge.40 The closest-to-official document regarding India’s nuclear 
posture and doctrine is the National Security Advisory Board’s (NSAB) “Draft Nuclear 
Doctrine,” which was released in 1999.41 The NSAB was comprised of an eclectic mix of 
security strategists within and outside of government, members of civil society, and journalists. 
37 Ibid, 353.
38 Ibid, 371.
39 Ibid, 408-416.
40 For this thesis, nuclear “posture” is comprised of three components: doctrine regarding nuclear weapons use, 
organizational structure (which includes command and control), and force structure.
41 1999, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine”, Pugwash Conferences on 
Science and World Affairs, August 17. <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nw7a.htm>.
The basic tenets of this doctrine have been reiterated by Indian officials in the years since. The 
most notable components include:42
x Nuclear weapons will only be used to retaliate against a nuclear attack on Indian soil.
x India will not use nuclear weapons first in any conflict or exchange.
x “Credible Minimum Deterrence” capabilities (qualitative and quantitative) will be 
pursued in order to deter any adversary
o As part of credible minimum deterrence, India will pursue the “triad” of ground, 
sea, and air-based nuclear capabilities
x The decision to use nuclear weapons will rest with the highest civilian political leaders
While there are other parts of this draft regarding research and development, and the security and 
safety of the strategic arsenal, these contain very few specifics and/or are not central to the 
critical components of the document.
The first two components of India’s nuclear posture are doctrine and organizational 
structure regarding command and control of the nuclear weapons. Several scholars and experts 
agree that India not only established a “no first-use” commitment regarding nuclear weapons, it 
has maintained that commitment into the present day.43 In addition to this tenet of India’s nuclear 
posture, status quo policy has been that India will guarantee retaliation with nuclear weapons in 
42 1999. “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” Arms Control Today (July/August): 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99>.
43 Tellis, Ashley. 2002. “Toward a ‘Force-in-Being’: The Logic, Structure, and Utility of India’s Emerging Nuclear 
Posture.” Journal of Asian Studies 25: 64; Pant, Harsh. 2005. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: 
Implications for India and the World” Comparative Strategy 24: 279.
response to a nuclear or other WMD attack on its own soil or against Indian troops.44 The 
retaliation against a nuclear attack will be so strong and overwhelming that any potential enemy 
of India will incur unacceptable costs, which includes the death of a significant portion of the 
population. These decisions indicate that nuclear weapons will be used as political instruments 
meant to deter adversaries and are not intended to provide a battlefield advantage.
The organizational structure regarding stewardship of and decision-making about India’s 
nuclear forces has a number of core components. First, the decision to use nuclear weapons lies 
with political leadership. The group of policymaking elites that make these decisions are part of 
the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), which is comprised of the prime minister, National 
Security Advisor, along with other members of an executive and political council. Ultimate 
authority, however, lies with the prime minister.45 Stewardship of nuclear weapons components 
are divided between civilian and military institutions. Civilian institutions control the warheads 
and fissile cores, and the military controls the delivery systems (i.e. missiles, aircraft, etc.).46 One 
of the logics behind the decision to have these components separated is that the nuclear weapons 
and delivery vehicles will be able to withstand a potential counter-force nuclear strike by an 
adversary because the potential targets will be dispersed. During a supreme emergency when the 
weapons are to be used, these components will be transported across various distances and will 
be assembled and ready to carry out their missions. 
44 Narang, Vipin. 2012. “What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution Published Online (July): 8; Pant, Harsh. 2005. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and 
Command Structure: Implications for India and the World” Comparative Strategy 24: 279; and Tellis. “’Force-in-
Being’”: 64.
45 Pandit, Rajat. 2003. “Nuke command set up, button in PM’s hand,” The Times of India (January 4): 
<http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-01-04/india/27281139_1_nuclear-command-and-control-nuclear-
arsenal-nuclear-retaliation>.
46 Tellis. India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture. 431; and Basrur, Rajesh M. 2004 “India’s Escalation-Resistant…” 57.
The third component of India’s nuclear posture is its force structure, which has constantly 
been evolving and maturing since the 1998 nuclear tests. As part of its “credible minimum 
deterrence” requirement put forth in the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine, India has stated that it will 
develop a nuclear force “based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based 
assets.”47 These forces are intended to provide policymakers in New Delhi with the ability to 
maintain a nuclear force that can credibly threaten unacceptable destruction upon an adversary in 
a response to a nuclear attack. Part of this credibility means being able to achieve certain 
targeting goals (i.e. important cities, assets, etc.) in the adversary or potential adversary’s country 
and having a residual force that is large enough to retaliate. In its ostensible pursuit of a credible 
minimum deterrence capability, India has expanded the size of its nuclear arsenal (number of 
warheads) and has developed and operationalized a wide range of ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles, and sea-based nuclear capabilities. 
The quantitative expansion of New Delhi’s strategic forces refers to the number of 
nuclear warheads in its stockpile. Official numbers are Indian government secrets, but expert 
estimates are widely seen as the best alternative. These periodic assessments are carried out by 
Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, who have made estimates regarding all nuclear weapons 
states’ force capabilities. The first estimate of Indian forces was published in 2002. At this time 
India was estimated to have 30-35 warheads in its stockpile.48 In 2005, the estimate increased to 
40-50 warheads,49 and the 2007 estimate was 50-60.50 The two most recent estimates were 60-80 
47 1999. “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” Arms Control Today (July/August): 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99>.
48 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2002. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2002” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists. 58 (2): 70-72.
49 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2005. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2005” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists. 61 (5): 73-75.
50 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2007. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s Nuclear Forces, 2007” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists.63 (4): 74-78.
(2010) and 80-100 (2012).51 52 These figures are not conclusive, yet they do provide insights into 
crucial trend lines regarding the quantitative expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal.
India’s qualitative capabilities have grown as well. After the nuclear weapons tests, India 
had to choose whether it would push forward with advanced delivery systems or not.53 Ballistic 
missile development and operationalization has been a cornerstone of New Delhi’s force 
modernization and advancement since 1998. The two series of ballistic missiles are the Prithvi 
and Agni.54 The former series is comprised of several short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), and 
the latter series contains missile with medium-range and intercontinental capabilities. While 
there are three different versions of the Prithvi ballistic missile, the only one that has a nuclear 
mission is the Prithvi-I, which has a range of 150 km, and of the five Agni missiles tested so far, 
only the Agni-I and Agni II are fully operational.55 Below is a chart containing the names and 
estimated ranges of India’s ground-based ballistic missiles:
Missile Estimated Range
Prithvi-I 150 km
Agni-I 700 km
Agni-II 2,000 km
Agni-III 3,000 km
Agni-IV (Agni-II +) 3,500 km
51 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2010. “Nuclear Notebook: Indian Nuclear Forces, 2010” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists. 66 (5): 76-81.
52 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2012. “Nuclear Notebook: Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists. 68 (4): 96-101.
53 Huntley, Wade L. 1999. “Alternate Futures after the South Asian Nuclear Tests: Pokhran as Prologue.” Asian 
Survey 39 (3): 504-524.
54 For an archive of Agni and Prithvi missile testing, see: 2011. “India Missile Chronology” Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (July): <http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/india_missile.pdf?_=1316466791>.
55 Kristensen and Norris. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2012…”
Agni-V Over 5,000 km
These missiles provide India the ability to strike targets all throughout Pakistan, and the Agni-V 
is capable of striking any major city in China. Recently, it was announced that a new missile, that 
Agni-VI, is under development, will have a farther reach than the Agni-V, and will be able to 
carry multiple warheads (MIRVs).56 However the only fully-operational missiles thus far are the 
Prithvi-I, Agni-I, and the Agni-II. While India’s ballistic missile program began in the 1980s, the 
testing and development of these systems was ramped up and made more transparent after the 
1998 nuclear weapons test.
New Delhi has also proceeded with the development of a cruise missile system. The 
BrahMos cruise missile is being developed in cooperation with the Russian government,57 and it 
is estimated that the BrahMos’s range is between 300-500 kilometers.58 The advantage that 
cruise missiles have over ballistic ones is that these former are more accurate and can be fitted 
with larger nuclear warheads. While it is unclear as to if and when the BrahMos will be inducted 
into India’s nuclear forces, this development and cooperation between the Russians and Indians 
cannot go unnoticed.
In addition to land-based ballistic missiles and the BrahMos cruise missile, the Indian 
government has been developing a variety of sea-based nuclear systems, including the Sagarika 
(or K-15) sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that will equip the INS Arihant ballistic missile 
56 2013. “Agni-VI missile in the works, India to be in world’s elite nuclear club,” The Indian Express (February 9): 
<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/agnivi-missile-in-the-works-india-to-be-in-worlds-elite-nuclear-
club/1071407>.
57 2008. “Flight test of BrahMos cruise missile next year: Pillai” The Hindu (January 25): 
<http://www.hindu.com/2008/01/25/stories/2008012560320800.htm>.
58 2010. “BrahMos cruise missile test-fired successfully,” Times of India (March 22): 
<http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-03-22/india/28124829_1_mobile-autonomous-launchers-brahmos-
block-ii-290-km-range>.
submarine (SSBN). 59 The Sagarika ballistic missile is modeled after the land-based Agni III 
missile, except it has been modified so that it can be fired from underneath the ocean’s surface.60
These capabilities further enhance the Indian nuclear arsenal’s invulnerability to a potential first 
strike by a nuclear-armed adversary, thereby enhancing the retaliatory capability. In addition to 
the nuclear submarine capability, the New Delhi has developed and inducted the “Dhanush” a 
ballistic missile (variant of the Prithvi II) that is launched from ships at sea.61 These capabilities 
help to form the nuclear triad of India’s land, sea, and air-based nuclear capabilities.
This is a broad overview of the history of India’s nuclear program, as well as the more 
recent developments and advancements of its nuclear forces.  However, this brief history begs 
the question about the quantitative and qualitative developments since the 1998 nuclear weapons 
tests: why has India embarked on its current nuclear trajectory? The potential explanations vary 
from internal influences emanating from bureaucratic and organizational interests, to an external 
threat environment that has driven India in this direction. The next section of this article assesses 
the underlying causes of New Delhi’s nuclear advancements and enhancements since 1998.
Spiral Model and External Threat Perceptions
Using Jervis’s Spiral Model
Robert Jervis’s spiral model, which explains why states respond to external threats and 
bolster their defense capabilities, is a useful tool to analyze different countries’ arms buildups. It 
will also be shown that it is useful for analyzing India, more specifically. This approach contains 
59 2009. “INS Arihant Launch Boosts India’s Strategic Ambitions,” Military Technology Military Technology 33 (9) 
(September): 134.
60 Dikshit, Sandeep. 2008. “Sagarika to be tested soon off Orissa,” The Hindu (February 19): 
<http://www.hindu.com/2008/02/19/stories/2008021959711000.htm>.
61 2004. “Dhanush missile successfully test-fired,” The Hindu (November 8): 
<http://www.hindu.com/2004/11/08/stories/2004110806870100.htm>.
several different tenets. First, due to the anarchic state of international relations – also known as 
the “self-help” system – states must fend for themselves in order to ensure their survival.62
Because states are the only guarantors of their own survival, they will seek to enhance their 
security through a variety of means (alliances, military capabilities, etc.). As stated earlier in this 
essay, the self-help situation creates a dynamic known as the security dilemma, which is a 
perpetual spiral of two states seeking to match or exceed one another’s actions.63 This leads to an 
arms race.
Jervis further argues that psychological factors reinforce and intensify the security 
dilemma. States first develop images of each other (friendly, hostile, neutral, etc.) based on past 
experiences in addition to the military capabilities that each state possesses. Those images create 
a cognitive rigidity that influences policymakers to assume the worst, and even “ambiguous and 
even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image.”64 As a result, cognitive rigidity 
reinforces the security dilemma. These images are formed by important historical events (wars, 
revolutions, crises, etc.), policymakers’ firsthand experiences, and generational effects.65 This 
theory is analytically robust and provides a nuanced account of the impact of external forces 
(China and Pakistan) on India’s nuclear trend lines. As the data and available information will 
show, the vast majority of India’s nuclear developments since 1998 are due to the impact of the 
threat of Pakistan, though the potential threat emanating from China cannot be dismissed.
The Spiral Model and India’s Response to the Pakistani Threat
62 Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press): 62.
63 Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press): 64.
64 Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press): 68.
65 Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press): 217-266.
There are several core indicators regarding the empirical data of India and Pakistan’s 
security behavior which suggests that they are following a tit-for-tat buildup of nuclear 
capabilities. The first indicator, consistent with the spiral model, is that Pakistan and India have 
developed hostile images of each other, due to prior crises and wars. This hostile image is 
confirmed by the lack of economic activity between the two countries. Though trade has 
increased since the 1990s, the absolute level of economic activity remains negligible.66 The 
second indicator is that the quantitative expansion of both India and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals 
have followed similar trend lines, in spite of India’s ability to develop an even larger arsenal than 
it has. The third important indicator is that both countries engaged in a tit-for-tat missile 
development and testing phase from1998 to 2006, with the competition becoming less intense 
since 2006. Moreover, public statements by Pakistani and Indian officials have buttressed these 
patterns by showing that they are interested in matching the threat posed by each country’s 
primary adversary. I conclude this section by arguing that the quantitative expansion of India’s 
nuclear arsenal has been primarily a result of the Pakistani threat, and its qualitative missile 
developments were a direct response to the Pakistani threat, with that response becoming less 
direct in the following years. 
According to Robert Jervis’s spiral theory, conflicts and crises between states have 
profound impacts on the development of images. The history of India-Pakistan relations is 
replete with these perception-shaping events. In 1965, tensions flared over border dispute near 
the Arabian Sea and eventually spread to the disputed region of Kashmir, resulting in a relatively 
2012. “Trade Relations between Pakistan and India.” (Islamabad, Pakistan: Pakistan Institute of Legislative 
Development and Transparency): 
<http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/FP/TradeRelationsbetweenPakistanAndIndia_IndianPerspective_Ja
n2012.pdf>.
brief, but quite intense, armed conflict.67 The second conflict – which was larger – occurred in 
1971 when Indian armed forces assisted the separatist movement in East Pakistan, which by 
extension pressured Pakistani forces trying to maintain law and order. As the situation 
deteriorated, the Pakistani military withdrew, leading to the vivisection of Pakistan and the 
creation of Bangladesh.68 Since this conflict, Pakistani officials have vowed to “never again” 
allow a similar event to occur, and it even had a significant impact on the development of 
Pakistan’s own nuclear weapons program.69 Today, the Pakistani Army refers to 1971 as the 
most tragic year in Pakistan’s history.70 However, 1971 did not mark the end of conflicts and 
crises between the two countries.
Throughout the 1980s until the present day, both Pakistan and India have been 
responsible for instigating crises and conflicts. In 1986, India conducted a large-scale military 
exercise and simulated war game near its western border with Pakistan, which led Pakistan to
misinterpret India’s actions and mobilize its forces near the border. Each country thought that the 
other was about to launch a large-scale attack. No shots were fired, but the “Brasstacks” crisis 
raised tensions and suspicions.71 In 1989, the Indian military countered extremist militant 
uprising in Indian-administered Kashmir, a militant movement supported by the Pakistani 
government and military. This crisis did not lead to a full-scale conflict between India and 
67 See: Barnds, William J. 1972. India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers. New York: Published for the Council on 
Foreign Relations, by Praeger.
68
69 For a historical account of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, see: Khan, Feroz Hassan. 
2012. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
70 “1971 War” Pakistan Army Website. 
<http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=197&rnd=446>.
71 Kanti P. Bajpai, P.R.Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, Sumit Ganguly. 1995. Brasstacks and 
Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, (New Delhi: Manohar). 
Pakistan.72 Even though conflict was averted, this was another important event that further 
deteriorated relations.
In 1999, the Kargil War dashed all hopes at improvements in peace between the two 
countries. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart A. B. Vajpayee had 
previously met in Lahore in February 1999 and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
that charted a path towards rapprochement.73 However, several months later, the Pakistani 
military, acting independently of civilian political authority, carried out an offensive military 
operation in Kargil, which is located in Indian-administered Kashmir. A war ensued that 
eventually led to over one thousand battle deaths.74 Since Kargil, two crises have been sparked 
by sub-state militant groups supported by Pakistan’s security apparatus. In 2001-2002, the Twin 
Peaks crisis occurred when militants associated with Jaish-e-Mohammad attacked the Indian 
parliament building. As a result, both India and Pakistan’s armed forces mobilized for war.75 The 
second occurred in November 2008 when Lashkar-e-Taiba killed one hundred-fifty individuals 
in Mumbai.76 As a response to these crises, India developed a set battlefield plans that allow for 
quick strikes into Pakistani territory, should another crisis or small-scale incursion take place in 
the future.77 The significance of these crises and wars is that they reinforce the hostile images 
that both India and Pakistan have of each other. Even in a case where both countries are 
72 For information on the threat this crisis had to stability, see: Hagerty, Devin T. 1995/1996. “Nuclear Deterrence in 
South Asia,” International Security 20 (3) (Winter): 79-114.
73 For full text of the MoU, see: “Lahore Summit” The Henry L. Stimson Center (Posting date unknown): 
<http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/lahore-summit/>.
74 For a detailed account of the Kargil War, see: 2009. Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Kargil Conflict. Ed. Peter Lavoy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
75 For information on this crisis, see: Praveen Swami. 2009. “A War to End a War: the Causes and Outcomes of the 
2001-2 India-Pakistan Crisis” In Ganguly And Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia (New York: Routledge): 
144-162; and Bajpai, Kanti. “To War or Not To War: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2001-2,” in Ganguly and Kapur, 
Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia 162-182.
76 For an assessment of the Mumbai crisis, see: Seth G. Jones et al. 2009. “The Lessons of Mumbai” RAND 
Occasional Paper. <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf>.
77 Ladwig III, Walter C. 2007/2008. “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” 
International Security 32 (3): 158-190.
optimistic about improving relations, past experience spoils future hopes. The rigidity of these 
hostile images is important for Jervis’s spiral model.
Another specific example of hostile image formation can be seen with a Pakistani missile 
test in 1998. In April of 1998 – before either Pakistan or India tested nuclear weapons – Pakistan 
tested the 1500 km-range Ghauri ballistic missile. This range enables Pakistan to strike nearly all 
of the largest cities within India. Justifiably, India felt a strong sense of insecurity as a result, and 
the test solidified then-Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s decision to move forward with the 
nuclear weapons tests. The Indian nuclear test in turn catalyzed the Pakistani decision to move 
forward with its nuclear weapons test.78 This back-and-forth is a perfect example of how both 
countries respond to each other and have developed hostile images of each other.
These dynamics and occurrences have had an indelible impact on relations between the 
India and Pakistan. An appropriate contemporary indicator of hostile images is a dearth of direct 
economic activity. In fact, no direct trade is conducted between Pakistan and India, and only 
Kashmir-based economic activity is conducted.79 While both countries have provided “most-
favored nation” (MFN) status to one another, economic activity has remained anemic. Moreover, 
Pakistan’s security institutions are constantly reminded by India’s offensive military operations 
in the 20th century, and Indian policymakers continually fear the next terrorist attack or operation 
by the Pakistan Army. Nuclear weapons capabilities exacerbate tensions and hostile perceptions. 
These images are buttressed by observable behavior and force estimates that suggest India and 
Pakistan have become engaged in an arms race.
78 For a more detailed historical account, see: Perkovich, George. 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press): 409-424.
79 For a review of Pakistan and India’s lack of economic linkages, see: Syed, Maria. 2012. "Pakistan-India Trade: 
Rationale and Reality." Pakistan Horizon 65, no. 3: 85-101.
In addition to the development of hostile images, there are three components of evidence 
that are consistent with the basic tenets of Jervis’s spiral model. First, both countries have 
followed similar quantitative expansions of their arsenals, and Pakistani and Indian public 
officials’ public rhetoric buttresses these trends and suggests that the quantitative size of both 
countries nuclear arsenals are tied to each other. Second, the two countries tested nuclear-capable 
missiles on a fierce tit-for-tat basis from 1998 to 2006, and to a lesser degree after 2006. Third, 
both countries’ policy-makers have a propensity to make worst-case assessments of inherently 
ambiguous nuclear capabilities and developments, which is consistent with Jervis’s argument 
that leaders will fit discrepant information with a preexisting image. This evidence shows that 
the great bulk of India’s nuclear developments can be traced to the external threat posed by 
Pakistan.
The first body of evidence of India’s nuclear developments consistent with Jervis’s spiral 
model is the parallel quantitative expansion of its nuclear stockpile with the expansion of 
Pakistan’s. The figures – widely used by India-centric literature – are based on periodic 
estimates. While they may be estimates in the truest sense of the term, they illuminate general 
trend lines of India and Pakistan’s force expansions. This can show a “tit-for-tat” development. 
In 2002, India reportedly possessed 30-35 warheads in its stockpile.80 In 2005, the estimate 
increased to 40-50 warheads,81 and the 2007 estimate was 50-60.82 The two most recent 
estimates were 60-80 (2010)83 and 80-100 (2012).84 Pakistan’s force expansion has mirrored 
80 Kristensen and Norris. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2002” 
81 Kristensen and Norris. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2005” 
82 Kristensen and Norris. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2007” 
83 Kristensen and Norris. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2010” 
84 Kristensen and Norris. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 2012” 
India’s. In 2001, it was estimated to have 24-48 warheads,85 and in 2007 it was estimated to have 
around 60 warheads in its stockpile.86 The 2009 and 2011 Pakistani nuclear force estimates were 
70-90 87 and 90-110, 88 respectively. Both countries have more than doubled their warhead 
stockpiles since the beginning of the 21st century. Moreover, it has also been argued that India is 
capable of expanding its arsenal at a much quicker rate, but has not done so.89 These mirroring 
trend lines suggest that neither country is keen on falling behind the other in the quantitative size 
of their arsenals. Doing so would leave one’s own nuclear forces at-risk of a crippling nuclear 
first strike by the other.
These mirroring trends are supported by public statements by policymakers in India and 
Pakistan. In 2011, in response to a question regarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal expansion, 
India’s defense minister said that India would be responding and “taking care of that” expansion 
with its own actions.90 Moreover, former Minister of External Affairs for India Jaswant Singh 
stated that India’s nuclear arsenal would not be a fixed number and would be tied to the level of 
the external threat posed by an adversary.91 Former Indian National Security Advisor from 1998-
2004 Brajesh Mishra echoed these sentiments and said that India’s nuclear arsenal can be 
expanded at any moment if “certain events” occur.92 Pakistani officials have argued in similar 
terms. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf suggested that the size of India and 
85 Kristensen Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2002. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2001” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists. 58 (1): 70-71.
86 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2007. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 2007” Bulletin of 
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87 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2009. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 2009” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists. 65 (5): 82-89.
88 Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2011. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 2011” Bulletin of 
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89 Krepon, Michael. 2013. “The Tortoise and the Hare.” Arms Control Wonk (February 24): 
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91 Kharnad, Bharat. 2008. India’s Nuclear Policy. 89.
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Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal were joined at the hip, and that any reduction in the arsenals would 
have to be made cooperatively.93 Pakistani officials have additionally stated that the size of their 
nuclear arsenal will be used “to deter all forms of aggression, mainly from India.”94 The above 
evidence shows a linkage between the quantitative size of both India and Pakistan’s nuclear 
arsenals.
In terms of qualitative missile capabilities, there has also been an action-reaction dynamic 
occurring between Pakistan and India. Missile tests are useful indicators because countries 
frequently use missile tests to signal their emerging and already-established capabilities.95 From 
1998 to 2006, there was fierce tit-for-tat testing between India and Pakistan. During this period, 
India conducted 40 ballistic and cruise missile tests, all of which had an estimated average range 
of around 513.25 kilometers.96 These missiles included the Agni-I, Agni-II, and the Prithvi 
missiles that are reportedly designated to nuclear missions. Pakistan, on the other hand, tested 28 
cruise and ballistic missiles during the same period of time, all of which had an average 
estimated range of 1056 kilometers.97 These average distances are useful for Pakistan and India 
only against each other. With both countries frequently publicizing their missile tests during this 
time period suggests that the announcement of Indian tests were to show Pakistan that it 
possessed significant capabilities as well. Moreover, given the context of this time period, which 
included the nuclear weapons tests, the 1999 Kargil War, and the 2001-02 “Twin Peaks” crisis, it 
93 2004. “N-arsenal to be cut if India follows suit: Musharraf urges peace in region,” Dawn (June 5): 
<http://archives.dawn.com/2004/06/05/top2.htm>.
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files/1340000409_86108059.pdf>.
95 See: Khan, Feroz Hassan. 2003. “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” in Michael 
Krepon, Rodney W. Jones and Ziad Haider (eds.), Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia 
(Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center): 75-100.
96 Dalton and Tandler. 2012. “Understanding the Arms Race in South Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
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is clear that threat perceptions manifested themselves in the testing and development of India and 
Pakistan’s various missile capabilities.
The other tenet of Jervis’s spiral model is that states will assume the worst about 
ambiguous developments and actions in a country with which it has a hostile image. There is 
substantial evidence that suggests both Pakistan and India have done this regarding each others’ 
nuclear capabilities and developments. For example, in June 2000, Pakistani officials offered to 
start a “restraint regime” that would curtail a hasty buildup of nuclear and conventional weapons 
between the two countries. This seemingly conciliatory gesture was categorically rejected by 
India, which labeled it as “propagandist.”98 This certainly is a result of hostility between the two 
actors as a result of the Kargil War. India understandably rejected the offer, and it is important to 
note that this is prime evidence that supports Jervis’s main thesis that any conciliatory gestures 
will be rejected by adversaries. Moreover, this is evident when Pakistan fits India’s development 
of sea-based nuclear capabilities into its preexisting hostile image of India. Pakistani officials 
have made frequent statements that the nuclear missile-equipped submarine will undermine 
stability in the subcontinent and will spark a fierce arms race between the two countries.99 The
reason this is a significant development is because nuclear submarines are inherently ambiguous 
in terms of deterrence objectives. It is impossible to discern which country India is intending to 
deter with this capability, and as a result, it cannot be seen as an overt and direct threat to one 
country’s security. Pakistan’s hostile image of India seemed to predetermine the threat 
assessment of the nuclear submarine.
98 2000. “India rejects Pak. proposal, terms it ‘propagandist’” The Hindu (June 15): 
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99 Subramanian, Nirupama. 2009. “Destabilising step: Pakistan,” The Hindu (July 28): 
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India has, in turn, signaled ambivalence and even an unwillingness to progress forward 
on substantive peace talks with Pakistan even when Pakistani leaders make positive gestures. 
This is primarily due to their unwillingness to trust Pakistan in a meaningful way because of 
Pakistan’s involvement as a spoiler in crises and conflicts. A “trust deficit” exists between the 
two. Indian External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna stated that India had been assured at the 
highest levels that Pakistan would not be supporting terrorism, but that trust was lost due to the 
Mumbai attacks.100 He has further argued that Pakistan has always had a posture of “compulsive 
hostility.”101 These quotes accuse Pakistan of holding nefarious designs and motives and state 
that, even if Pakistan were interested in holding peace talks, India will be reluctant to move 
forward.
The empirical evidence regarding India and Pakistan’s nuclear developments suggests 
that many of the short and medium range ballistic missiles which were tested in the early to mid-
2000s were done so due to the external threat that each state posed to the other. The context of 
relations included the Kargil War as well as the Twin Peaks crisis of 2001-02, which heightened 
the sense of insecurity by both states. There is also a tendency, as seen above, by policymakers to 
tie their nuclear pursuits to what happens in the external threat environment. Moreover, the 
quantitative expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal since 1998 (as well as Pakistan’s) indicates that 
both countries are seeking to maintain parity in terms of quantitative nuclear capacity. Neither 
state wants to fall behind the other, which would then damage each state’s ability to retaliate in 
the event of a nuclear war. These tit-for-tat developments in quantitative and qualitative missile 
capabilities – along with Pakistan and India’s longstanding hostile images of each other – show 
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that Jervis’s spiral model helps to explain that India has made a bulk of its nuclear developments 
in response to the external threat posed by Pakistan.
External threat posed by China
India’s relationship with China has not been plagued by the frequent crises and conflict 
that have consistently rotted the relationship between India and Pakistan. However, there has 
been tension in the past, such as the 1962 war between the two. New Delhi and Beijing also have 
longstanding territorial dispute over the state of Arunachal Pradesh. In spite of these problems, 
both China and India have not had the frequent negative experiences that precipitate hostile 
images of each other. In the nuclear realm, both India and China have significant disparity in 
terms of quantitative nuclear forces, and we have not seen a tit-for-tat buildup in each country’s 
nuclear capabilities. Moreover, if India wished to more quickly achieve parity with China, it 
could have done so but, as stated previously, has not. However, it is argued here that India is 
hedging against a future Chinese threat by incorporating long-range missile systems that can 
effectively deter against any aggressive policies enacted by Beijing.
Both India and China do not yet have hostile images of each other. However, those 
images have not been completely friendly, necessarily. As both China and India have grown 
economically and expanded their military capabilities, certain points of tension have been 
building. One example is the budding maritime rivalry in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of 
Southeast Asia. Both countries are seeking to secure their economic interests, and the naval 
realm appears set to be a point of contention for both New Delhi and Beijing as their perceived 
interests clash.102 However, this new development and tension has also been met with news of 
102 Mohan, C. Raja. 2012. Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace).
possible maritime cooperation and joint military exercises being conducted between the two 
countries.103 While tensions may be rising, both countries are willing to establish the necessary 
linkages to minimize the risks associated with their cashing interests. This suggests that both 
countries, currently, do not necessarily have adversarial images of one another, but that a base 
line of tension exists between the two. This tension has the potential to be cause for concern in 
the future, but for the time being, conflict appears on the horizon.
The China-Pakistan security nexus has also been influenced India’s image of China. At 
various points through the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the Chinese 
government provided substantial technical and material assistance to the Pakistanis. This 
assistance played an important role in allowing Pakistan to cross the threshold and become a 
nuclear weapons state.104 Moreover, Beijing has provided Islamabad and Rawalpindi with 
difficult-to-obtain ballistic missile components and plans.105 A CIA report argued that China 
violated international export controls by transferring arms to Pakistan as it was in the latter 
stages of its nuclear weapons development.106 China’s connection to Pakistan’s security 
apparatus has heightened India’s overall concerns. Moreover, Pakistanis and Chinese have 
become concerned with greater security cooperation between the United States and India. The 
prime example of this was their displeasure with the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation 
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agreement.107 This deal enables India to possibly devote more nuclear materials to weapons 
purposes.
Another indicator of relations not being adversarial between China and India is the level 
of economic activity between the two. Over the last decade, trade between the two has increased 
manifold. In 2000, total trade between China and India was $3 billion, and it increased to around 
$74 billion in 2011.108 In addition to this trend line, the two countries have signed on to several 
economic cooperation agreements which span from the service sector, to manufactured 
hardware, to consumer goods (among many other areas of trade).109 This component of the Sino-
Indian relationship, in addition to the aforementioned security ambivalence between Beijing and 
New Delhi, is indicative of an image that is relatively neutral, with a potential for future tensions. 
Put simply, the two countries do not view each other in a hostile way.
In terms of India’s nuclear weapons capability developments, there are several indicators 
that it is responding potential threat posed by China. Three of India’s ballistic missile capabilities 
have utility against Chinese cities. The first is the Agni-III medium range ballistic missile, which 
has a range of around 3,000 km. The other two are the Agni-IV and Agni-V, which have ranges 
of around 3,500 km and over 5,000 km, respectively. While the Agni-III and Agni-IV can strike 
targets deep within China, the Agni-V provides India with the farthest reach and can strike nearly 
all of China’s major cities, including Beijing. These three missile capabilities have limited or no 
utility in deterring the Pakistani threat. Moreover, the Indian government announced in 2013 that 
it has been designing the new Agni-VI ballistic missile, which has an even farther reach than the 
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Agni-V.110 These capabilities provide India with a much-desired deterrent capability against 
China.
Another ballistic missile-related indicator of India’s underlying motives in developing its 
missile capabilities to respond to a potential Chinese threat is the frequency and average distance 
of those ballistic missile tests. Since 2006, India publicized thirteen different ballistic missile 
tests. The average distance of these tests was around 2,500 km.111 That figure is a stark contrast 
to the average distance of the missile tests from 1998 to 2006, which, as previously mentioned, 
averaged 513.25 km. The shift in this trend suggests that India’s increased technological 
capability to produce more sophisticated systems afforded it to concentrate on the threat posed 
by China. Moreover, the increased tensions over the maritime rivalry as well as other systemic 
issues in the security environment support this claim.
Indian nuclear doctrine and public statements by officials buttress this argument and 
suggest that New Delhi’s recent missile pursuits are in fact driven by the Chinese threat. The first 
evidence is the consistent claim that India’s nuclear deterrent is not country-specific. Interviews 
with former Indian national security officials Brajesh Mishra and K. Subrahmanyam have argued 
that India’s flexible deterrence requirements are not “country-specific.”112 Other officials have 
echoed these sentiments.113 Since India, in its nuclear doctrine and elsewhere, has stated that it 
will only use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a nuclear strike on its own soil, it can be 
surmised that India’s nuclear deterrent objectives lie only with those countries that possess 
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nuclear weapons. As such, India’s nuclear-capable ballistic missile developments since 2006 
have become more emphasized on developing those missiles that can target various locations 
within China.
While the India’s missile developments and signaling have indicated a shift in focus 
towards meeting the Chinese threat, the quantitative expansion of the arsenal has not yet been 
indicative of such a shift. As previously mentioned, the Indian nuclear warhead stockpile has 
doubled since 2002, and the most recent estimate in 2012 was 80-100. China’s arsenal, on the 
other hand, in both 2010 and 2011, was estimated to have approximately 240 nuclear 
warheads.114 While India’s upward trend could be indicative of its desire to reach parity with 
China’s quantitative nuclear force capabilities, this ignores a key point. India has the capacity to 
build nuclear weapons at a far quicker pace than it is doing so today.115 If India were interested 
in establishing parity with China’s nuclear force capabilities, it could be expected that it would
proceed as quickly as possible. This suggests the potential Chinese threat – although present in 
Indian policymaking calculus – is not an immediate threat and does not warrant a rapid buildup 
in quantitative nuclear capabilities.
Consistent with the spiral model’s argument that states with non-hostile images of one 
another will not necessarily fall down a path of fear and security dilemma, India and China do 
not appear to be headed down this path. However, this is not to say that the threat posed to India 
by China is going unnoticed. To the contrary, much of New Delhi’s energy in its nuclear 
weapons capabilities pursuits has been directed towards developing long-range ballistic missile 
systems that can effectively deter the threat posed by Beijing’s strategic arsenal.  As seen with 
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the missile test trend change since 2006 and the open-ended deterrence requirements, it can 
clearly be seen that the rising concentration of India on Beijing has precipitated this 
development. The quantitative expansion of India’s arsenal, on the otherhand, is not directly tied 
to the survivability of its nuclear forces vis-à-vis China’s counterforce threat as New Delhi, if it 
so chooses, could proceed to expand its arsenal at a far higher rate in order to reach parity with 
Beijing.
To conclude, there is significant evidence that the quantitative expansion of India’s 
nuclear arsenal is a direct response to the threat posed by Pakistan. This dynamic is reinforced by 
the hostile images that both countries have of each other. Secondly, India’s missile developments 
from 1998 to 2006 were primarily a response to the threat posed by Pakistan, with New Delhi’s 
attention shifting since 2006 towards the potential threat emanating from Beijing. While there is 
significant evidence supporting these claims, it is necessary to explore another potential source 
of influence: domestic organizations and bureaucracies.
Internal Factors
Bureaucratic Politics
One other lens through which to analyze India’s nuclear expansion and enhancements is 
by looking at the competing interests of bureaucracies, and how those interests manifest 
themselves in policy outcomes. The term “bureaucratic interests” raises several possible 
explanations as to what constitutes an “interest.” The first possibility is that each bureaucracy has 
an interest in maximizing resource allocation and maintaining a constant flow of funds to keep 
its operations salient. Second, the different branches of the military and the research and 
development apparatus seek to have the most sophisticated weapons systems and push the limits 
of technological innovation. Third, each organization may have a different outlook regarding 
their nation’s role in the global or regional system of states, one that influences the policies each 
one will prescribe. These are a few among a wide range of possible specific bureaucratic and 
organizational interests.
Within India’s bureaucratic and national security system, there are several organizations 
that may have influence over what constitutes the necessary and proper nuclear weapons 
policies. First, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) conducts 
feasibility studies, designs new weapons systems, and tests the nuclear capable missiles. The 
other organizations include the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, all of which are the stewards 
of the nuclear weapons’ delivery vehicles and would carry out any mission to strike an adversary 
with a nuclear weapon. Another organization is the Indian Strategic Forces Command (SFC), 
which is an independent armed services entity that dedicates itself to the protection and 
maintenance of India’s nuclear stockpiles. While there is evidence that suggests that each of the 
organizations seeks to maximize resource allocation, motivated by prestige, and has contrasting 
views of what constitutes appropriate nuclear weapons policies, it is concluded in this section 
that it is nearly impossible to use this information to establish causality in decision-making. 
However, I do not preclude the possibility of these organizations influencing New Delhi’s 
decision-making calculus in a meaningful way.
The first indicator of these organizations competing for influence in India’s nuclear 
decision-making process is the issuance of conflicting and organization-propping public 
statements regarding the appropriate measures for India to take. The first example is the Indian 
Navy’s longstanding claim that a nuclear submarine which is equipped with nuclear-tipped 
ballistic missiles is a necessary ingredient for achieving “credible minimum deterrence.”116
Another example of this bureaucratic interest of the Navy to have a more privileged place in 
India’s nuclear policies was iterated in the 2004 Maritime Doctrine, which said that, unlike all 
no-first-use nuclear powers, “India stands out alone as being devoid of a credible nuclear 
triad.”117 The Arihant nuclear submarine will provide the Navy with a more sophisticated and 
less vulnerable system, and it provides the Indian Navy with a more important role in Indian 
defense matters.
A second example of a component of India’s armed forces having organization-specific 
interests is with the Indian Strategic Forces Command (SFC). While the SFC is not an official 
wing of the Indian armed forces, it is a quasi-military organization which is the steward of 
India’s nuclear stockpiles. In 2010, it was reported that the SFC made a proposal to acquire 40 
fighter jets capable of conducting nuclear missions.118 If this proposal is indeed operationalized, 
it would form a new part of the already-established air-based leg of India’s nuclear triad. This 
organization-specific request is indicative of different organizations attempting to wrest control 
of a greater portion of India’s nuclear forces. Moreover, while this report was based on internal 
Indian defense sources and did not include a response from the Indian Air Force (IAF), it is 
likely that the IAF did not welcome the move as it would eliminate the branch’s monopoly on 
nuclear-capable aircraft.
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There are also examples of competing statements made by the bureaucracies and 
branches of the military regarding what constituted “credible minimum deterrence.” This essay 
previously discussed the Indian Navy’s desire to incorporate sea-based nuclear capabilities as 
part of “credible minimum deterrence.” However, in June 2011, Commander-in-Chief of SFC 
stated that India is “way up and ahead on what we need to do (in the creation of minimum 
credible nuclear deterrence.”119 This suggests that there are competing interpretations regarding 
what capabilities are needed by India in order to achieve a credible minimum deterrence 
capability. These suggest that the different branches of the military compete with one another to 
promote their own specific interests.
Notwithstanding this evidence of bureaucratic jostling, there is one caveat when looking 
at the role of the armed forces in India’s nuclear planning. The nuclear program and force 
planning has largely shunned the branches of the military, and the civilian leaders are often the 
ones making the strategic plans to acquire different capabilities.120 Even when India embarked on 
its nascent nuclear weapons program in the latter half of the 20th century, the civilian leadership 
excluded military brass from providing substantial input in the program’s direction.121 Moreover, 
while it had always been assumed that the Indian nuclear program was under civilian authority, it 
was formally expressed through the creation of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in 
2003.122 If the civilian leaders and entities have virtually all control over nuclear force planning 
in India, then the validity of a component of the bureaucratic politics theory must be questioned. 
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However, evidence regarding a civilian bureaucracy with a history of substantial influence in 
policymaking circles – the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) –
provides more evidence of how organizational interests have potentially influenced India’s 
nuclear policy planning.123
When India conducts missile tests or inform the press of newly-developed, designed, or 
inducted nuclear capabilities, DRDO officials will make public statements as well. In these 
statements, there is evidence of the DRDO holding organization-specific interests that are then 
able to influence policy outcomes. These arguments have centered on justifications such as 
enhanced nuclear deterrence, international prestige, and profit motives. All three of these 
motives form DRDO’s organizational interests, which then leads it to advocate for the Indian 
government to develop and operationalize certain nuclear capabilities. While the potential 
influence of the DRDO’s bureaucratic interests cannot be precluded, it is not possible to establish 
a clear causal relationship between these interests and the final policy outcomes.
The first component of DRDO’s organizational interest is the desire to develop a greater 
deterrent capability for the Indian government. In November 2010, a DRDO official stated that 
the 5000 km-range Agni V, as well as the slightly shorter range Agni II +, would boost India’s 
deterrent capabilities.124 There have been additional statements that have alluded to how new 
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missile and delivery vehicles will help to boost India’s security.125 These statements would 
suggest that the DRDO has India’s security situation in mind when it advocates for different 
projects and systems that should be incorporated into India’s nuclear arsenal. However, the 
supposedly increased security that these systems provide is not DRDO’s only motive.
Another common theme seen in DRDO’s public statements regarding India’s emerging 
nuclear capabilities is that, by developing and incorporating increasingly sophisticated nuclear 
weapons systems, India will become part of an elite club, and its status in the international 
system will be enhanced. When the Agni-V ballistic missile was successfully tested on 
Thursday, April 19, 2012, head DRDO official and Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister 
V.K. Saraswat said, “This missile belongs to the 21st century not only in timeframe but in 
technological capability.”126 Regarding the development stages of the Agni-V, the director of the 
Agni program Avinash Chander said that “this technology is developed by very few countries 
and we are on a par with them now.”127
DRDO is also vocal of the fact that India has developed missile technologies in the face 
of international efforts to prevent them from doing so. After the successful flight tests of the 
Agni-III missile, V.K. Saraswat showed a great deal of pride of DRDO being able to develop a 
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missile indigenously and in spite of the Missile Technology Cut-off Regime (MTCR).128 The 
MTCR is an international effort to prevent the illicit sale and spread of missile technology and 
components, an effort which is part of the international community’s broader nonproliferation 
efforts. This arrangement includes most developed countries and all nuclear weapons states 
formally recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Similar comments related to 
prestige have been offered up for successful flight tests of the Agni-IV ballistic missile.129
Additionally, the Sagarika underwater-launched ballistic missile – which will help to form part 
of India’s nuclear triad – has been a point of pride for DRDO. The director of the Sagarika 
program said, “India is the fifth country to have an underwater launch system. The other 
countries are the U.S., Russia, France, and China.”130 These statements are consistent with the 
logic that each organization in a government’s bureaucratic system is interested in enhancing 
India’s international prestige and becoming associated with the most technologically advanced 
systems.
There is also evidence of a third bureaucratic interest: the potential resource allocation
motive of DRDO and its officials. By continuing the development of more advanced nuclear 
capabilities, this ensures that funds will continue to be devoted to DRDO, ensuring the 
sustainability of its existence and operations. Additionally, these funds are also used to pay for 
the salaries of the officials working within DRDO. After the successful test of the Agni-V 
ballistic missile, V.K. Saraswat (Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister) stated that there is 
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export potential for some of the missile technologies that India has developed.131 While he did 
not specify that the nuclear-capable missiles would be suitable for exporting to friendly nations, 
his statement did suggest that DRDO has an interest in continuing the development of missile 
technology in order to maintain its privileged position within the Indian bureaucratic system. 
There is also evidence of tensions between DRDO and other public officials and 
bureaucracies regarding the battle for resources and that DRDO’s technological developments 
are not essential for Indian national security purposes. Defence Minister A. K. Antony suggested 
that DRDO had an archaic way of operating and needed to change its mindset if India is to 
achieve self-reliance and meet its maximum potential.132 After an attempt to reign in the resource 
allocations to the DRDO, there was significant backlash from current and former leaders of the 
DRDO.133 Many of the proposals in the past have hit bureaucratic roadblocks.134 In 2010, there 
were attempts at making the DRDO more accountable financially due to the dissatisfaction of the 
armed services.135 Further evidence of these conflicting interests occurred in 2008 when the 
Indian Army showed its dismay with DRDO’s plans to develop an anti-aircraft (potentially 
nuclear-capable) missile.136 This evidence–coupled with the other evidence – suggests that 
DRDO’s policy proposals are largely driven by its specific bureaucratic interests, as are the 
branches of the military.
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In spite of this evidence, it is extremely difficult to establish a causal relationship 
between India’s nuclear developments and the parochial interests of the various bureaucracies. 
The prior argument and observations are made with inferences on the role of the DRDO in 
nuclear decision-making. One must remember that the relative weight of the different 
bureaucracies are hard to measure because the deliberations in the meetings to are never made 
public. This makes the bureaucratic politics theory nearly impossible to prove in India’s case. 
However, one certainly cannot preclude the possible substantial influence of DRDO in India’s 
nuclear policymaking process. There is substantial evidence that preliminarily suggests that 
organizational interests are influencing the final policy outcomes and the nuances of New 
Delhi’s specific nuclear weapons policies. Moreover, it can also be surmised that external threats 
posed by China and Pakistan provide the initial impetus for Indian civilian policymakers to move 
forward with the decision to develop a weapons system, while the bureaucracies help to sustain 
the policies.
Internal Factor for the Buildup: Indian Nationalism
One other internal factor that needs to be considered is the role of Indian and Hindu 
nationalism in promoting an aggressive and/or expansionist foreign policy strategy. Indian 
nationalism has been a prominent feature of Indian politics and social movements. In fact, it has 
played a prominent role in contemporary Indian politics and society.137 The argument of Hindu 
nationalism is that India is a distinctly “Hindu” country. It also espouses a sense of entitlement 
and hubris in the region. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – a Hindu-nationalist party – came to 
power in 1998 and stayed in power until 2004. The BJP has been one of the most vocal 
For more on Hindu nationalism, see: Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2007. Hindu nationalism a reader. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave: democracy and Hindu nationalism in 
modern India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
supporters of an assertive Indian national security strategy and was in power when the nuclear 
weapons tests took place in 1998. Moreover, such nationalist sentiments also permeated the 
ranks of the Indian Congress Party, which has been the dominant political party in India since 
independence. It is evident, then, that the importance of nationalist ideology has also played a 
supporting role in inflating threats abroad from Pakistan and the need for India to be the 
dominant power in the region. These ideas manifest themselves in the expansion and 
enhancement of India’s nuclear arsenal.
The Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in India in 1998, supplanting the Congress 
Party’s near-monopoly on Indian national politics. Its main party platform evoked Hindu 
nationalism and the belief that India should be the dominant actor in the subcontinent. In the 
BJP’s manifesto which was made public before it came to power, it advocated for the testing and 
development of a nuclear weapon and different nuclear capabilities. It said, “Though the BJP 
stands committed to a nuclear-free world, we cannot accept a world of nuclear apartheid... [the 
party declared it would] reevaluate the country’s nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct 
nuclear weapons.”138 Moreover, the manifesto said the party would “expedite the serial 
production of Prithvi and make Agni I operational for the deployment of these missiles.”139 In 
the run-up to the 1998 election, BJP officials made public statements along similar nationalist 
lines. Brajesh Mishra stated that “given the security environment, we [India] have no option but 
to go nuclear,” referring to the perceived threats posed to India by China and Pakistan.140 Such 
sentiments play a major role in India’s overall nuclear trajectory, especially when the BJP was in 
power from 1998 to 2004.
138 Bharatiya Janata Party Manifesto. 1996. FBIS-NESA, (supplement), May 10: 11.
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Such sentiments do not necessarily stem directly from the threat that Pakistan poses to 
India’s security. Rather, the threat becomes inflated by Hindu-nationalist ideas which became 
engrained in a significant portion of India’s electorate and political elite. The nuclear trend lines 
of both India and Pakistan follow a similar trajectory not only because of the legitimate threat 
that each state poses to the other, but also from an idea which results in poor relations between 
the two countries. Pakistan had been created at independence as a state for Indian Muslims, and 
India was intended to be a country for Hindus. The animosity between the two groups and 
communities had created hostilities between the two. Therefore it is argued that the identity-
driven animosity between these two groups has reinforced the poor relations between the two 
countries.
The Hindu-nationalist sentiments have also permeated the Indian Congress Party after the 
BJP took over in 1998. The Indian Congress Party returned to power in the 2004 elections, 
removing the BJP’s six-year rule in India. However, one of the main reasons why Congress was 
capable of making a comeback in Indian politics was because it made a shift in its attitudes on 
foreign policy issues. No more could Congress afford to have a dove-ish approach to foreign 
policy and potentially promote peace with Pakistan. In order to continue to be seen as a party 
protecting and advancing India’s interests, Congress needed to take a hard-line approach on 
foreign policy issues.141 This shift ensured the maintenance of the foreign policy status quo 
which the BJP had created when it came to power, and the development of a nuclear arsenal has 
also been part of this status quo.
Wilkinson, Steven I. 2005. “Elections in India: Behind the Congress Comeback,” Journal of Democracy 16 (1): 
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Therefore, it is argued that much of India’s nuclear trajectory has to do with the ultra-
nationalist sentiment that the BJP made the norm in Indian politics when it came to power in 
1998. These ideas played a prominent role in Indian decision-makers’ calculi leading up to the 
nuclear weapons test and placed India on a trajectory that would lead them to the expansion of 
India’s nuclear arsenal and the development of different nuclear delivery capabilities. From 1998 
to 2004 (when the BJP held power), missile testing was quite frequent, as shown earlier. Missile 
testing has continued since then, and the expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal has remained 
constant since the 1998 tests, regardless of political party. This evidence shows that Indian 
nationalism has not necessarily been the sole cause of India’s nuclear expansion and 
enhancement, but that it has certainly reinforced and heightened any of the security concerns 
which Indian policymakers have had regarding the external threat posed by Pakistan and China.
Conclusion
This essay concludes by arguing that – given the available evidence and data – India’s 
nuclear buildup is largely a product of the external threat posed to it by Pakistan. When applying 
Robert Jervis’s spiral model to this case one can see that the quantitative and (part of the) 
qualitative nuclear trend lines of both countries evince a “tit-for-tat” expansion and 
enhancement. However, Jervis’s spiral model also shows that the potential threat emanating from 
Beijing has impinged on Indian strategic decision-making to a lesser degree. While these 
external threats are catalyzing policymakers in New Delhi, it is impossible to preclude the 
possibility of India’s bureaucracies and military branches promoting their specific interests, 
which then translates into the nuclear policy outcomes. Given the evidence regarding external 
threats and internal sources of influence, this essay shows that it is more likely that India’s 
nuclear buildup has been in response to external threats of various forms.
By assessing the threat of external adversaries through Jervis’s spiral model, I show that 
the threat posed to India by Pakistan has been a driving source of New Delhi’s strategic nuclear 
decision-making. From 1998 to 2006, the two countries engaged in tat-for-tat missile testing in 
terms of timing and of range. Moreover, both India and Pakistan’s nuclear force expansion have 
followed the same trajectory, with both possessing anywhere from 80 to 100 nuclear warheads. 
Further evidence that the size of one country’s arsenal is tied to the other’s is that India’s nuclear 
arsenal could expand even further if its policymakers chose to do so. Since it has not chosen to 
do so and follows a clear path with Pakistan shows that the external threat is impinging on the 
quantitative expansion of its arsenal. This buildup has been reinforced by the hostile perceptions 
that both states continually hold of each other, which creates a cognitive rigidity when making 
policies. These findings are consistent with the core arguments of Jervis’s spiral.
However, it is also to note that the threat of China has also impacted India’s nuclear 
buildup, albeit to a lesser degree than Pakistan’s impact. The longer-range Agni missiles which 
increase the range of India’s nuclear deterrent to targets deep within China are prime evidence of 
this occurrence. These long-range developments have occurred in tandem with the intensification 
of the Sino-Indian rivalry in other areas, such as the naval area. However, because there is still a 
reasonable amount of non-hostile interaction between the two – such as economic activity and 
minimal military-to-military interactions in the form of joint exercises – both states’ images of 
each other have not turned hostile, and they have not fallen down the spiral of fear and hostility 
that Jervis argues can occur. 
The final component that this essay explores is the potential impact of bureaucratic 
interests on India’s nuclear force planning outcomes. Their impact cannot be precluded. The 
conflicting statements made by the different bureaucracies as well as the statements that suggest 
that financial interests play a role in the policies that each organization – especially the Defence 
Research and Development Organization – promotes. Moreover, it is important to see that there 
are competing statements by each of the bureaucracies regarding what constitutes the necessary 
and proper nuclear weapons development. While this evidence can be seen through a variety of 
different source materials, it is difficult to illuminate a clear causal linkage between bureaucratic 
interests and India’s nuclear policy outcomes, due to the extremely secretive nature in which 
these policies are formulated.
The one component of India’s nuclear weapons development that remains the most 
difficult to analyze – no matter the theoretical approach – is its nuclear missile-equipped nuclear 
submarines. This capability will form the third leg of the triad. There is very little information 
regarding the development of this capability as well as the factors that have impacted the 
decision to deploy this capability in the near future. The nuclear submarine was included in the 
1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine, but little is known about why New Delhi has pursued its 
development, as the destabilizing effects of the capability could be detrimental to peace and 
stability between Pakistan and India and China and India. This certainly makes it likely that the 
Indian Navy has played an important role in advocating for this particular system.
This essay has not ended the debate regarding internal versus external impacts on nuclear 
force planning. However, I have showed through the available sources that the evidence suggests 
that external forces are dictating India’s nuclear force capabilities – more so than the potential 
internal influences on policy, given the way in which Jervis’s spiral model yields significant 
insights into India’s nuclear trend lines. The threats posed by Pakistan and China almost 
certainly have had a significant impact on many of India’s decisions to move forward with 
various ballistic and cruise missile developments, and the expansion of the nuclear arsenal as a 
whole. However, it is important to leave open the possibility of bureaucracies and branches of 
the military having an impact on force planning. Arising from these conclusions are several 
policy prescriptions.
In terms of areas that need to be explored for further research, one possibility could be to 
look at the role of international prestige in impacting India’s nuclear decision-making. While this 
article explores several different possible underlying causes of India’s nuclear trend lines, it did 
not fully explore this possibility. There is a wide swath of literature with broadly argues that 
states pursue different foreign policies because of the role of international prestige, and that 
nuclear weapons provide this prestige. If this possible cause is to be explored further in India’s 
case, it is necessary to devise a systematic assessment that can weight its impact against the other 
potential underlying causes of nuclear behavior.
Policy Prescriptions
Even when countries fall down a spiral of fear and hostility (consistent with Jervis’s 
spiral model), all is not lost in terms of relations reparations. Since this security dilemma is 
reinforced by the hostile images that both states have of each other, it is difficult to make quick, 
wide-sweeping changes in their respective foreign policies. However, incremental steps can be 
taken to improve relations between India and Pakistan. By improving communication links, 
engaging in cultural and social exchanges, and slowly increasing economic activity between both 
countries, the hostile images that both states have of each other can be slowly alleviated. These 
types of measures helped incrementally unthaw and ameliorate tensions during the Cold War 
between the United States and Soviet Union. While the tensions will most likely remain present 
at any degree, by focusing on ways to reduce the hostile nature of relations, one can then hope 
that relations between the two will become ameliorated, with the end result being a reduced 
chance of conflict and/or nuclear war.
More ambitiously, New Delhi and Islamabad can engage one another and pursue 
potential arms control and reduction agreements. These agreements will necessarily place 
limitations on the capabilities that each country can pursue. Moreover, these arrangements can 
provide assurance. Such measures served a similar purpose during the Cold War and helped to 
reduce the possibility of an all-out cataclysmic conflict between two nuclear-armed adversaries. 
While these agreements will provide benefits to the two parties involved, these arrangements are 
extremely difficult to formalize. Détente between India and Pakistan will be a necessary 
precondition.
While these initial steps between India and Pakistan will be important, it will become 
equally vital for both countries to address outstanding territorial dispute in Kashmir and Sir 
Creek as well as contentions regarding the future of Afghanistan. The Kashmir and Sir Creek 
disputes have been intractable thus far, but with the correct atmosphere between the two 
countries and creative policymaking, a settlement could perhaps be made. Moreover, if both New 
Delhi and Islamabad recognize that both countries stand to gain from a peaceful Afghanistan, 
this could provide further impetus for cooperation. However, these issues are quite complex, and 
previous noble efforts at resolving these disputes have fallen short. That said, they will need to 
be addressed for tensions to be reduced in the future – which would mitigate the effects of the 
negative spiraling of relations.
By extension, the same measures can be taken to prevent hostile images from developing 
between China and India. As stated earlier, both countries do not have extremely hostile images 
of each other. Rather, they have begun to feel some tensions, but also engage in a variety of 
bilateral and multilateral policies that suggest they are not willing to cut off ties. However, 
relations can deteriorate. As both Beijing and New Delhi continue to advance their conventional 
and nuclear force capabilities, it is possible that hostile images could begin to form. This does 
not need to happen if the appropriate measures are enacted: maintaining and boosting current 
levels of economic activity, having regular contact between military and political leaders, and 
engaging in cultural exchanges. Tensions between India and China are increasing, and the 
maritime rivalry in the Indian Ocean between the two is certainly reason for considerable 
concern. Moreover, China’s continued cooperation with Pakistan on security issues will also 
strain relations. This is not to say that a complete deterioration of relations will inevitably 
develop. The negative consequences of those tensions can be mitigated if both China and India 
engage in incremental steps to avoid stepping down a path towards the downward spiral and 
recognize that initial steps of developing more nuclear arms can be avoided.142
It is difficult to establish meaningful and lasting peace in the subcontinent. However, by 
taking incremental steps, it will provide an opening for a more meaningful amelioration of 
tensions to take place. India and China need not head down a path of fear and hostility, as India 
and Pakistan have done. Cautious steps by both sides, which will also include the maintenance of 
communication between government and militaries, will go a long ways toward establishing a 
level of stability between the two countries that will not lead to war. Equally important is for 
policymakers in Pakistan and India to take incremental confidence-building measures to slowly 
build up a sense of trust between the two countries. However, if past is any indication of future, 
stability between New Delhi and Islamabad will be fragile: a spoiler can act irresponsibly and 
142The same could be said for avoiding unnecessary tensions in U.S.-China relations.
erode any improvements in relations. Responsibility by all parties involved is a necessary 
ingredient for peace.
Bibliography
2013. “Agni-VI missile in the works, India to be in world’s elite nuclear club,” The Indian 
Express, February 9. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/agnivi-missile-in-the-works-india-to-
be-in-worlds-elite-nuclear-club/1071407.
2013. “India, China agree to hold joint military exercise,” The Indian Express, January 15. 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-china-agree-to-hold-joint-military-exercise/1059308.
2012. “India test launches Agni-V long-range missile.” BBC, April 19. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-17765653.
2012. “Liberate scientific pursuit from bureaucratic clutches: Nair,” The Indian Express, 
September 24. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/liberate-scientific-pursuit-from-bureaucratic-
clutches-nair/1007145.
2012. “’Tremendous potential to export missiles to friendly nations,’” The Hindu, April 29. 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tremendous-potential-to-export-missiles-to-
friendly-nations/article3365999.ece.
2011. “Antony: Not worried about Pak n-arsenal,” The Indian Express, June 11. 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/antony-not-worried-about-pak-narsenal/802119.
2011. “India Missile Chronology” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July. 
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/india_missile.pdf?_=1316466791.
2011. “India ready for ‘step by step’ approach with Pak” The Indian Express, January 26. 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-ready-for-step-by-step-approach-with-pak/742381/1.
2011. “Pakistan must discard posture of compulsive hostility: India” The Hindu, January 4. 
http://www.hindu.com/2011/01/04/stories/2011010460680200.htm.
2010. “BrahMos cruise missile test-fired successfully,” Times of India, March 22. 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-03-22/india/28124829_1_mobile-autonomous-
launchers-brahmos-block-ii-290-km-range.
2010. “Strategic Command to acquire 40 nuclear capable fighters,” The Indian Express, 
September 12. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/strategic-command-to-acquire-40-nuclear-
capable-fighters/680636.
2009. “INS Arihant Launch Boosts India’s Strategic Ambitions,” Military Technology Military 
Technology 33 (9): 134.
2008. “Flight test of BrahMos cruise missile next year: Pillai” The Hindu, January 25. 
http://www.hindu.com/2008/01/25/stories/2008012560320800.htm.
2007. “India to launch indigenous n-submarine by ’09: Navy Chief,” The Indian Express, 
December 4. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-to-launch-indigenous-nsubmarine-by--
09-navy-chief/246495/1.
2004. “Dhanush missile successfully test-fired,” The Hindu, November 8. 
http://www.hindu.com/2004/11/08/stories/2004110806870100.htm.
2004. “N-arsenal to be cut if India follows suit: Musharraf urges peace in region,” Dawn, June 5. 
http://archives.dawn.com/2004/06/05/top2.htm.
2001. “India not engaged in nuclear race.” The Hindu, March 27. 
http://www.hindu.com/2001/03/27/stories/0227000b.htm.
2000. “India rejects Pak. proposal, terms it ‘propagandist’” The Hindu, June 15. 
http://hindu.com/2000/06/15/stories/01150001.htm.
“1971 War.” Pakistan Army Website. 
http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=197&rnd=446.
Allison, Graham and Fredric Morris. 1975. “Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons” 
Daedalus 104: 99-129.
Bajpai, Kanti. 2009. “To War or Not To War: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2001-2,” in Nuclear 
Proliferation In South Asia, ed. Ganguly and Kapur, 162-182. New York: Routledge.
Bharatiya Janata Party Manifesto. 1996. FBIS-NESA, (supplement), May 10: 11.
Barnds, William J. 1972. India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers. New York: Published for the 
Council on Foreign Relations.
Basrur, Rajesh. “India’s Escalation-resistant Nuclear Posture” in Escalation Control and the 
Nuclear Option in South Asia, eds., Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones and Ziad Haider 
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004): 56-74.
Bedi, Rahul. 2004. “A new doctrine for the Navy,” Frontline 21 (14) (July 03-16). 
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2114/stories/20040716002104600.htm.
Brooks, Harvey. 1975. “The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race” 
Daedalus 104 (3): 75-98.
Buzan, Barry. 1987. An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International 
Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
Buzan, Barry and Eric Herring. 1998. The Arms Dynamic in World Politics. (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner).
Chari, P.R. 2000. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine.” The Nonproliferation Review 7 (3): 123-135.
Dalton, Toby and Jaclyn Tandler. 2012. “Understanding the Arms ‘Race’ in South Asia.” The 
Carnegie Papers (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organization (India). 
1998. “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and 
Development Organisation,” May 17. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/india/1998/980500-drdo.htm.
Dikshit, Sandeep. 2008. “Sagarika to be tested soon off Orissa,” The Hindu, February 19. 
http://www.hindu.com/2008/02/19/stories/2008021959711000.htm.
Evangelista, Matthew. 1988. Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press).
Freedman, Lawrence. 1981. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. (New York: St. Martins).
Glaser, Charles. 2000. “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 3: 251-276.
Greenwood, Ted. 1975. Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision-Making (Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger).
Hagerty, Devin T. 1995/1996. “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” International Security 20 (3): 
79-114.
Halperin, Morton H. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution).
Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave: democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern 
India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1958. “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results” Public Policy 8: 41-86.
Integrated Headquarters (Indian Navy). 2004. Indian Maritime Doctrine. (New Delhi).
Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2007. Hindu nationalism a reader. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Jones, Seth G. et al. 2009. “The Lessons of Mumbai” RAND Occasional Paper. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf.
Kanti P. Bajpai, P.R.Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly. 1995. 
Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, (New Delhi: 
Manohar).
Karnad, Bharat. 2008. India’s Nuclear Policy. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International).
Khan, Feroz Hassan. 2012. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press).
Khan, Feroz Hassan. 2012. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford Security Studies, Stanford University Press).
Khan, Feroz Hassan. 2003. “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” 
in Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones and Ziad Haider (eds.), Escalation Control and the 
Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center): 75-100.
Kier, Elizabeth. 1997. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Koithara, Verghese. 2012. Managing India’s Nuclear Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press).
Krepon, Michael. 2013. “The Tortoise and the Hare.” Arms Control Wonk, February 24. 
http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3706/the-tortoise-and-the-hare#more-3263.
Krishnaswami, Sridhar. 2001. “’China supplied missile parts to Pak.’” The Hindu, August 7. 
http://www.hindu.com/2001/08/07/stories/01070004.htm.
Krishnaswami, Sridhar. 2000. “CIA report finds increased Chinese arms sales to Pak.” The 
Hindu, August 10. http://www.hindu.com/2000/08/10/stories/03100003.htm.
Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2011. "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011." Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists. 67 (6): 81-87.
Kristensen, Hans. M. and Robert S. Norris. 2010. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2010.” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists. 66 (6): 134-141.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2002. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 
2002” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 58 (2): 70-72.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2005. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s nuclear forces 
2005” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 61 (5): 73-75.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2007. “Nuclear Notebook: India’s Nuclear Forces,
2007” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.63 (4): 74-78.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2010. “Nuclear Notebook: Indian Nuclear Forces,
2010” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 66 (5): 76-81.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2012. “Nuclear Notebook: Indian Nuclear Forces,
2012” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 68 (4): 96-101.
Kristensen Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2002. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces,
2001” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 58 (1): 70-71.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2007. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 
2007” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 63 (3): 71-74.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2009. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 
2009” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 65 (5): 82-89.
Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. 2011. “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 
2011” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 67 (4): 91-99.
Kumar, Hari. 2012. “India and China Deepen Economic Ties,” New York Times, November 27. 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/india-and-china-deepen-economic-ties/.
Ladwig III, Walter C. 2007/2008. “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited 
War Doctrine,” International Security 32 (3): 158-190.
“Lahore Summit” The Henry L. Stimson Center (Post date unknown). 
http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/lahore-summit/.
Lavoy, Peter, ed. 2009. Assymetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the 
Kargil Conflict. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Mallikarjun, Y. 2008. “Agni-V design completed; to be test-fired in 2010,” The Hindu, 
November 27. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/agniv-design-completed-to-be-
testfired-in-2010/article1384080.ece.
Mallikarjun, Y. 2007. “DRDO begins work on Agni-IV missile,” The Hindu, August 9. 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/drdo-begins-work-on-agniiv-missile/article1888805.ece.
McNamara, Robert. 1967. “The Dynamics of the Nuclear Strategy” Department of State Bull 57.
Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
Mohan, C. Raja. 2012. Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
Narang, Vipin. 2012. “What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and 
International Conflict” Journal of Conflict Resolution Published Online (July).
National Security Advisory Board. 1999. “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” Arms Control Today,
July/August. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99.
Pandit, Rajat. 2003. “Nuke command set up, button in PM’s hand,” The Times of India, January 
4. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-01-04/india/27281139_1_nuclear-command-
and-control-nuclear-arsenal-nuclear-retaliation.
Pant, Harsh and Gopalaswamy Bharath. 2008. “India’s Emerging Missile Capability: The 
Science and Politics of Agni-III,” Comparative Strategy 27 (4): 376-387.
Pant, Harsh. 2007. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure,” Armed Forces & Society 
33 (2): 238-264.
Pant, Harsh. 2005. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for India 
and the World” Comparative Strategy 24 (3): 277-293.
Perkovich, George. 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press.
Posen, Barry. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between 
Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Prasad, K.V. 2010. “Discard old mindset, Antony tells DRDO,” The Hindu, February 24. 
http://www.hindu.com/2010/02/24/stories/2010022459282000.htm.
Praveen, Swami. 2009. “A War to End a War: the Causes and Outcomes of the 2001-2 India-
Pakistan Crisis” in Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia, ed. Ganguly And Kapur, 144-162. New 
York: Routledge.
Pubby, Manu. 2009. “DRDO revamp: Antony appoints high-level panel,” The Indian Express, 
June 12. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/drdo-revamp-antony-appoints-highlevel-
panel/475162/.
Pubby, Manu. 2008. “We don’t need Akash missile, Army tells DRDO,” The Hindu, January 8. 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/we-don-t-need-akash-missile-army-tells-drdo/258844.
Rehman, Iskander. 2012. “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and 
Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean” Naval War College Review 63 (4): 64-88.
Sagan, Scott. 1996/1997. “Why do states build nuclear weapons?” International Security 21 (3): 
54-86.
Shapley, Deborah. 1978. “Technology Creep and the Arms Race: ICBM Problem a Sleeper” 
Science, September 22: 1102-1105.
Snyder, Jack. 1984. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decisions and the Disasters of 1914 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Subramanian, T.S. 2013. “Agni-VI all set to take shape.” The Hindu, February 4. 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/agnivi-all-set-to-take-shape/article4379416.ece.
Subramanian, T.S. and Y. Mallikarjun. 2012. “In Wheeler Island, a perfect mission sparks 
celebrations,” The Hindu, April 20. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-wheeler-island-a-
perfect-mission-sparks-celebrations/article3332940.ece.
Subramanian, T.S. 2012. “Agni-IV scores a hit yet again,” The Hindu, September 20. 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/agniiv-scores-a-hit-yet-
again/article3916483.ece.
Subramanian, T.S. and Y. Mallikarjun. 2012. “K-15 all set to join Arihant,” The Hindu, 
December 27. http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/27/stories/2009072755801000.htm.
Subramanian, T.S. 2010. “Agni-II + launch before December 10,” The Hindu, November 28. 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/agniii-launch-before-december-
10/article918781.ece.
Subramanian, T.S. and Y. Mallikarjun. 2010. “DRDO raises the bar, sets its sights on 5,000-km 
Agni-V,” The Hindu, February, 8. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/drdo-raises-the-bar-
sets-its-sights-on-5000km-agniv/article102608.ece.
Subramanian, T.S. 2007. “Agni-1 launch successful,” The Hindu, October 6. 
http://www.hindu.com/2007/10/06/stories/2007100662140100.htm.
Subramanian, Nirupama. 2009. “Destabilising step: Pakistan,” The Hindu, July 28. 
http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/28/stories/2009072860551000.htm.
Sultan, Adil. 2011/2012. “Pakistan’s Emerging Nuclear Posture,” Strategic Studies, XXXI & 
XXXII (4 & 1). Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad: http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-
files/1340000409_86108059.pdf.
Syed, Maria. 2012. "Pakistan-India Trade: Rationale and Reality." Pakistan Horizon. 65 (3): 85-
101.
Tellis, Ashley. 2000. India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready 
Arsenal. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand).
Tellis, Ashley. 2002. “Toward a ‘Force-in-Being’: The Logic, Structure, and Utility of India’s 
Emerging Nuclear Posture.” Journal of Strategic Studies 25 (4): 61-108.
United States Government. 2010. “Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear 
Stockpile,” Department of Defense, May 3.
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-
03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf.
Unnithan, Sandeep. 2010. “DRDO: Trimming the fat,” India Today, May 28. 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/DRDO:+Trimming+the+fat/1/99242.html.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press).
Vyas, Neena. 1998. “BJP in Govt. to Exercise N-Option,” The Hindu, January 14.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.
Wilkinson, Steven I. 2005. “Elections in India: Behind the Congress Comeback,” Journal of 
Democracy 16 (1): 153-167.
